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Abstract
In decentralized trade individuals self-insure against consumption risk via costly diversiÞca-
tion of skills. Although money acts as consumption insurance, it may lead to a moral hazard
problem. If the problem is severe, monetizing trade can lower welfare relative to barter. JEL
Codes: E4, E5, Keywords: Money, Specialization, Lotteries
1 Introduction
In a decentralized barter economy agents tend to self-insure against consumption
risk by producing a broad set of goods to increase the probability of creating a
double coincidence match. In short, they diversify their production skills rather than
specialize. The use of money allows agents to consume in more states of the world
(single coincidence matches). Thus, money acts as a form of social consumption
1Corresponding author: Department of Economics, Gatton College of Business and Economics,
University of Kentucky, Lexington KY 40506. Phone: (859) 257-5975, Fax: (859) 323-1920, Email:
rrreed@uky.edu.
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insurance. However, a moral hazard problem arises since agents diversify less when
money is introduced which lowers the amount of self-insurance. If the moral hazard
problem is severe enough, then a monetary equilibrium may have higher consumption
risk and lower welfare than under barter.
We develop a model in which money is essential (see Wallace, 1998) to see
how monetizing trade affects decisions to self-insure against consumption risk. We
Þnd that for some parameterizations, the moral hazard problem is severe enough
that introducing money can lower welfare relative to barter. In short, individuals
specialize too much because they do not internalize that more diversiÞcation makes
it easier for others to trade as well.
2 Environment
The environment follows Kiyotaki and Wright (1993). Time is continuous and the
discount rate is r > 0. There is a [0, 1] continuum of inÞnitely-lived agents and
perishable good types uniformly distributed along a unit circle. Agent i derives
utility from consumption of commodities in the interval [i, i+ x] where x ∈ [0, 1] ∀i.
Consuming quantity q of any good in the consumption set provides utility u(q) > 0
and zero otherwise. Additionally u0(q) > 0, u00(q) < 0, and u(0) = 0.
Following Camera, Reed and Waller (2002), each agent is assigned a production
location k and chooses to produce goods in the interval [k − y/2, k + y/2] where
y ∈ [0, 1]. The agent chooses the magnitude of y to maximize her expected discounted
lifetime utility from consumption. A larger y means the individual diversiÞes more
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by acquiring more production skills. The choice of y is made at the beginning of
life, is permanent, and requires an initial investment cost e(y), with e0(y) > 0 and
e00(y) > 0. One can think of e(y) as the cost of acquiring the skill needed to produce
each type of good. Producing some quantity q of any good imposes a utility loss
on the agent of c(q) ≥ 0, where c(0) = 0, c0(q) > 0, c00(q) ≥ 0. Consuming own
production yields zero utility. We assume that there exists 0 < q < ∞ such that
u(q) = c(q), and u0(0) > c0(0).
A fraction M ∈ [0, 1] of individuals initially receives one unit of indivisible Þat
money. As in Camera et al. (2002) and in model-S of Rupert et al. (2001),
individuals cannot store more than one unit of money but barter is allowed in all
double coincidence matches. Agents engage in small trades, by using lotteries over
monetary payments as in Berentsen, Molico and Wright (2001).2
2.1 Exchange
Agents meet bilaterally and randomly according to a Poisson process with arrival
rate α. Only one transaction per period can be carried out and trading histories are
private information. Random matching generates consumption risk since agents only
consume when an appropriate barter or single-coincidence match occurs.
Let p(y) denote the probability agent i produces a consumption good for a ran-
domly encountered agent and p(Y ) the probability a randomly encountered agent
2This allows us to capture in a simple way the notion of divisible money without having to
solve for a distribution of money holdings. As shown by Berentsen and Rocheteau (2002) doing so
generates results comparable to those with full divisibility and a degenerate distribution of money.
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produces a consumption good for her. Following Camera et al, the ex-ante probabil-
ity that a randomly encountered agent can produce is consumption good is
p(Y ) =

x+ Y if Y ≤ 1− x
1 otherwise.
Similarly,
p(y) =

x+ y if y ≤ 1− x
1 otherwise.
The ex-ante probability of double coincidence of wants in a match is p(Y )p(y).
The sequence of events for an agent is as follows. At the beginning of time she
chooses y. Subsequently she searches, meeting other agents pairwise and randomly
over time. Contingent on a match, she bargains and trades after which she searches
anew. We study stationary symmetric equilibria.
2.2 Bargaining
Consider a match where trade is feasible. In barter matches agents engage in sym-
metric Nash bargaining. In single coincidence matches buyers make take-it-or-leave-it
offers to sellers.
Let Q denote the quantity of output received by agent i in a barter match and
q the quantity she produces. It is easy to demonstrate that in double coincidence
matches, agents will choose to barter rather than trade money.3 The quantities traded
3See Rupert et al (2001) and Camera et al (2002). If barter matches were asymmetric then agents
would resort to money as a means of trade (see Berentsen and Rocheteau (2003)).
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satisfy
maxq,Q[u(q)− c(Q)][u(Q)− c(q)]
s.t. u(q) > c(Q) and u(Q) > c(q).
The solution yields q = Q = q∗ where q∗ satisÞes u0(q∗) = c0(q∗).
In a single coincidence match, the trade can be executed if the buyer has money
but the seller does not. In this case the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to
the seller, asking her to produce Qm and offering her money with probability τ such
that the seller is indifferent. Lotteries effectively allow the buyer to ask for a smaller
quantity of goods by reducing τ below one. This makes money divisible and gives
it greater value. The buyer solves:
max
Qm,τ
[u(Qm)− τ(Vm − V0)]
s.t. τ(Vm − V0) = c(Qm) and τ ≤ 1
where Vm is the value of holding money for the buyer and V0 is the value of having
no money. Also, Vm and V0 are the sellers value of holding or not holding money,
respectively. DeÞne λ ∈ R+ as the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint
on τ . The solution satisÞes
u0(Qm) =
(Vm − V0) + λ
(Vm − V0) c
0(Qm) (1)
τ(Vm − V0) = c(Qm)
λ(1− τ) = 0, λ ≥ 0
Let τ∗ denote the optimal τ . If the constraint τ ≤ 1 binds then τ∗ = 1, λ > 0,
c(Qm) = Vm−V0. In a symmetric equilibrium, Vm−V0 = Vm−V0 implying u0(Qm) >
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c0(Qm). If the constraint does not bind, λ = 0 and
τ∗ =
c(Qm)
Vm − V0 ≤ 1.
As a result, u0(Qm) = c0(Qm) withQm = q∗. Thus, lotteries support surplus maximiz-
ing quantities whenever τ∗ < 1. Therefore, in a symmetric equilibrium all monetary
trades involve Qm ≤ q∗ so trades are small. Our numerical analysis chooses para-
meterizations such that τ∗ < 1 for most values of M so our welfare results are not
being driven by inefficient trades.
2.3 Value Functions
Under the bargaining procedures speciÞed, the value functions are given by:
ρV0(y, Y ) = p(Y )p(y)[u(Q)− c(q)]
ρVm(y, Y ) = p(Y )p(y)[u(Q)− c(q)]
+(1−M)p(Y )(1− p(y))[u(Qm)− τ(Vm(y, Y )− V0(y, Y ))]
(2)
where ρ = r/α. Rearranging yields the value of holding money:
Vm(y, Y )− V0(y, Y ) = (1−M)p(Y )(1− p(y))u(Qm)
ρ+ τ(1−M)p(Y )(1− p(y)) . (3)
2.4 Individuals choice of diversiÞcation
An individual chooses y prior to the distribution of money in the economy taking Y
as given. Knowing that q = Q = q∗ is independent of y but Qm and τ∗ depend on y
via (3) the agent chooses y to maximize:
W (y, Y ) = (1−M)ρV0(y, Y ) +MρVm(y, Y )− ρe(y)
= p(Y )p(y)[u(q∗)− c(q∗)]− ρe(y) + ρM(1−M)p(Y )(1− p(y))u(Qm)
ρ+ τ∗(1−M)p(Y )(1− p(y)) .
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The partial derivative of W (y, Y ) with respect to y is given by:
D(y, Y ) = p(Y )[u(q∗)− c(q∗)]− ρe0(y)− ρ
2M(1−M)p(Y )(1− p(y))u(Qm)
[ρ+ τ∗(1−M)p(Y )(1− p(y))]2
+
ρM(1−M)p(Y )(1− p(y))
ρ+ τ∗(1−M)p(Y )(1− p(y))
·
u0(Qm)− c
0(Qm)[Vm(y, Y )− V0(y, Y )]
Vm − V0
¸
∂Qm
∂y
where
∂τ∗
∂y
=
c0(Qm)
Vm − V0 ·
∂Qm
∂y
.
If λ > 0, then τ∗ = 1, ∂τ∗/∂y = 0, c(Qm) = Vm−V0 and ∂Qm/∂y = 0 since Vm−V0
does not depend on y. If λ = 0, then using (1) the term in square brackets is zero.
Hence,4
D(y, Y ) = p(Y )[u(q∗)− c(q∗)]− ρe0(y)− ρ
2M(1−M)p(Y )(1− p(y))u(Qm)
[ρ+ τ∗(1−M)p(Y )(1− p(y))]2 (4)
= D(y, Y )|M=0 −
ρ2M(1−M)p(Y )(1− p(y))u(Qm)
[ρ+ τ∗(1−M)p(Y )(1− p(y))]2
The Þrst term in (4) is the value of additional barter matches gained from pro-
ducing a wider variety of goods. The second term is the annuity cost of the initial
investment in skills. The third term is the reduction in the value of money from
greater diversiÞcation. By diversifying more, agents raise the probability of trading,
obtain more self-insurance and have less consumption risk. This lowers the insurance
value of having money which acts as a disincentive to diversify. When M = 0, the
choice of diversiÞcation in the barter economy comes from the Þrst two terms and is
denoted D(y, Y )|M=0. Since D(y, Y )|M=0 −D(y, Y ) > 0, the agent specializes more
4Without lotteries (4) determines y given that τ = 1 for all parameterizations. This is done in
the numerical section to compare welfare with and without lotteries.
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in the monetary economy, i.e., she self-insures less when money exists. This is the
moral hazard effect associated with monetizing trade.
For a given value of Y , ∂D(y, Y )/∂y < 0. Thus, if D(y, Y ) has an extremum on
[0, 1− x], then it is unique and a maximum. The agents choice of y satisÞes:
D(0, Y ) < 0 ⇒ y = 0
D(0, Y ) ≥ 0 ≥ D(1− x, Y ) ⇒ 0 < y < 1− x
D(1− x, Y ) > 0 ⇒ y = 1− x
.
In a symmetric steady state,
y∗ = 0,
y∗ = 1− x,
D(y∗, y∗) = 0
if
D(0, 0) < 0
D(1, 1) > 0
otherwise
. (5)
If λ > 0, τ∗ = 1, and Qm = qm satisÞes
c(qm) =
(1−M)p(y)(1− p(y))u(qm)
ρ+ (1−M)p(y)(1− p(y)) (6)
while for λ = 0, Qm = qm = q∗ and5
τ∗ =
ρc(q∗)
(1−M)p(y)(1− p(y))[u(q∗)− c(q∗)] . (7)
DeÞnition of Equilibrium. A symmetric, stationary, monetary, equilibrium is a
list {V0, Vm, y, q, qm, τ} satisfying (2), (5), q = q∗, and qm satisÞes (6) if τ∗ = 1 and
qm = q
∗ if τ∗ satisÞes (7).
5Since τ∗ ≤ 1 is required, we must have M ≤ 1 − ρc(q∗)
p(y)(1−p(y))[u(q∗)−c(q∗)] which is satisÞed for
sufficiently small values of M and ρ for all values of y.
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3 Welfare
How is steady-state welfare affected by the introduction of money? As demonstrated
above, the existence of money induces agents diversify less. But if all agents diversify
less, the number of matches in which a double or single coincidence occurs may
fall so much that trading volume actually falls. In short, while the use of money
expands the number of trades (welfare improving), agents actions collectively reduce
the probabilities that trades occur (welfare reducing). If this latter effect dominates,
then introducing money can reduce welfare.
It is difficult to determine analytical conditions such that welfare falls. Thus, we
resort to numerical simulations to calculate welfare. We use the functional forms
u (q) =
qσ
σ
, 0 < σ < 1, c (q) = q, e(y) =
ay2
2
which, for τ∗ < 1, yield
y∗ = 0,
y∗ = (1−σ)[2x−M(1−M)(2x−1)]((2+aρ)σ−2)+2(1−σ)M(1−M)
y∗ = 1− x
if
σ = 1
1 > σ > 2−M(1−M)2+aρ(1−x)−M(1−M)
0 < σ ≤ 2−M(1−M)2+aρ(1−x)−M(1−M)
.
Figure 1 plots welfare for barter, denoted WB, with lotteries, WL, and without
lotteries, Wm, where σ = .67, x = .3, ρ = 1, a = 1.5. For these parameters, the moral
hazard problem is small so introducing money improves welfare relative to barter and
the use of lotteries raises welfare even more. At a sufficiently high value ofM, τ∗ = 1
and the two graphs coincide. Thus, the use of money raises welfare and having it be
divisible enhances welfare.
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In contrast, in Figure 2 we set σ = .5, x = .2, ρ = 1, a = 1.4. In this case, the
moral hazard problem is large and introducing money causes diversiÞcation to fall so
much that welfare falls relative to barter, with and without lotteries. By specializing
too much, trading probabilities fall dramatically and in equilibrium, consumption
risk increases relative to barter. Surprisingly, welfare falls more with lotteries than
without. Lotteries raise the insurance value of money because they allow an agent to
hold onto money for a longer period of time on average. Thus, lotteries exacerbate
the moral hazard problem causing agents to diversity even less and welfare to fall
further.
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